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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate in this paper that a generative model can
be designed to perform classification tasks under challeng-
ing settings, including adversarial attacks and input distri-
bution shifts. Specifically, we propose a conditional varia-
tional autoencoder that learns both the decomposition of in-
puts and the distributions of the resulting components. During
test, we jointly optimize the latent variables of the generator
and the relaxed component labels to find the best match be-
tween the given input and the output of the generator. The
model demonstrates promising performance at recognizing
overlapping components from the multiMNIST dataset, and
novel component combinations from a traffic sign dataset.
Experiments also show that the proposed model achieves high
robustness on MNIST and NORB datasets, in particular for
high-strength gradient attacks and non-gradient attacks.
Index Terms— Generative model, classification, adver-
sarial defense
1. INTRODUCTION
Neural network architectures have been developed to achieve
human-level performance on standard vision tasks [1, 2].
However, it is acknowledged that feedforward networks have
difficulty at generalization under input distribution shifts,
e.g., novel object sets [3] and objects with overlaps [4]. Fur-
thermore, studies have shown that networks, even with high
standard test accuracy, can suffer from imperceptible ad-
versarial attacks [5]. While neither distribution shifting or
adversarial attacks are common cases in standard test envi-
ronments for image classifiers [6, 7], the demonstrated risk
of existing models have raised concerns over their real-world
applications (e.g., autonomous driving and security surveil-
lance) where failed classification for a short amount of time
can be catastrophic. These concerns have led to the question
of whether semantic attributes or physical components of
the inputs are truly understood by feedforward, albeit deep,
networks [1, 2]. Indeed, evidence showed that state-of-the-art
classification models have a drastically different accuracy
changing pattern than human beings in classifying image se-
quences with diminishing details [8], suggesting that the two
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Fig. 1. Schematic of the proposed generative model with sub-
networks for component-wise generation. Each sub-network
is gated by a binary component label yi. Classification is done
through optimizing z and y to match the generated image with
the input.
have different feature learning behaviors.
This concern over model generalizability and robust-
ness is intrinsic to classifiers that perform bottom-up signal
processing. Alternative models that integrate bottom-up pro-
cessing with top-down reasoning through recursive inference
have been studied [9, 10]. Of particular interest are recur-
sive compositional models (e.g., AND-OR templates [10])
that learn to match deformable objects and infer graph states
for detection and recognition. These models take advantage
of highly structured generators, e.g., by explicitly modeling
object edges and surfaces. However, the intrinsic trade-
off between model and computational complexity (for both
model learning and recognition/classification) may hamper
their application to general inputs for which the recognition
or classification tasks depend on a richer set of features. With
the rapid advance in generative models (e.g. GAN [11], Pix-
elCNN [12], and VAE [13, 14]), it is tempting to investigate
top-down classification mechanisms that incorporate more
flexible generators than compositional models.
To this end, we present in this paper a classification algo-
rithm where input images are classified by minimizing the dif-
ference between the target image and the output of a genera-
tor. We choose Conditional Variational Autoencoder (c-VAE)
as the backbone of our model due to its simplicity and good
convergence property. Following the argument that attribute
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recognition is key to object classification [15, 16], we focus
on the classification of attributes, or more specifically, the ex-
istence of object components from the input image, while as-
suming that the follow-up mapping from these components
to the object class is established. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the
model is built on a variational autoencoder whose decoder
is composed of separate sub-networks, where each compo-
nent is associated with a sub-network. Experiments show that
the proposed model demonstrates promising performance at
recognizing overlapping components from the multiMNIST
dataset, and novel component combinations from a traffic sign
dataset. The model also achieves high robustness on MNIST
and NORB datasets, in particular for high-strength gradient
attacks and non-gradient attacks.
2. RELATED WORK
Conditional generative models have been heavily investigated
in the literature. For example, VAE structure [13] is extended
into c-VAE [14] by including attribute variables as extra in-
puts. Besides, the latent variables are disentangled into two
sub-networks in [14] to perform foreground and background
separation. In our work, we further extended the c-VAE idea
to have more sub-networks where each sub-network corre-
sponds to a component. And instead of generation or seg-
mentation, we investigate the possibility to use the conditional
generative model to perform robust classification.
The utility of generative model as a defense mechanism
has been explored very recently. For example, defense GAN
[17] finds the closest generation from a GAN to a given input
image, and feeds the generated image to a vanilla classifier for
prediction. Similar to our approach, Schott et al. [18] chose
VAE to perform image generation and used the reconstruc-
tion error as a metric to perform classification directly, with-
out feedforward classifier involved. Compared with [18], the
proposed model has an optimized network structure and clas-
sification workflow, which makes it able to learn object de-
composition and handle more tasks like novel or overlapping
object recognition.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
3.1. Customized conditional variational autoencoder
We customize a conditional variational autoencoder to learn
the decomposition of object components. Let xr and y be
the input images and their corresponding components, re-
spectively. A binary component vector y encodes the ex-
istence of components within xr. It is assumed that the
maximum amount of possible components in the dataset is
n. Let z = Enc(xr, θ) ∈ Rp be the latent variable gen-
erated from the encoder Enc(·, θ) with parameters θ, and
xf (z, y, φ) =
∑n
i yiDeci(zi, φi) be the generated images
from the set of decoders Deci(·, φi) with parameters φi.
zi ∈ Rp/n is a segment of z corresponding to the ith compo-
nent. Following the formulation of variational autoencoders,
we define our training loss as:
E{xr,y}∼D
[
||xf (z, y, φ)− xr||22 + C
n∑
i
yTi KL(zi)
]
(1)
where KL(zi) is the sub-network-wise KL divergence of the
distribution of zi from a standard normal distribution. In the
presented experiments, Adam optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.001 is used for training.
3.2. Classification
Based on the learned generative model, the classification pro-
cess can be cast into an inverse problem, where we jointly find
z∗ and y∗ that minimize the difference between the generated
image xf and the target image xr in the image space:
z∗, y∗ = argminz∈Rp,y∈{0,1}nf(z, y, x
r),
f(z, y, xr) ≡ ‖xf (z, y, φ)− xr‖22.
(2)
Note that Eq. (2) is a combinatorial problem, since y is a bi-
nary vector. To make this problem feasible, we relax compo-
nent labels to be continuous within [0, 1], so that the optimiza-
tion problem becomes differentiable and can be solved effi-
ciently through gradient descent and back-propagation. In ad-
dition, a L1 penalty is introduced to regularize non-zero com-
ponents with weight c. The regularization is needed so that a
component will be correctly discarded (i.e., sub-network out-
puts suppressed) if its addition to the generated image does
not improve the reconstruction quality significantly. Lastly, it
is also found that minimizing the image-wise difference af-
ter a sigmoid transformation over the reconstruction further
improves the defense performance. With these modifications,
the classifier solves the following problem:
z∗, y∗ = argminz∈Rp,y∈[0,1]nF (z, y, x
r)
F (z, y, xr) = ‖Sig(xf (z, y, φ))− Sig(xr)‖22 + c‖y‖1,
(3)
where Sig(x) = sigmoid
(
β · x + b), and β, b are hyper-
parameters.
Upon convergence, z∗ and y∗ obtained via Eq. (3) will
be processed to derive the final classification result using the
following logic flow: First, if the lowest reconstruction loss
found is larger than a pre-set threshold l, the input image will
be classified as noise. This step is able to filter out adversarial
attacks using non-gradient methods such as Neuroevolution
of Augmenting Topologies (NEAT) [19]. After this initial fil-
tering, we apply two thresholds yl and yu (yl < yu) to y∗: an
element y∗i is set to 0 if y
∗
i < yl, and 1 if y
∗
i > yu. For the re-
maining elements of y∗ between yl and yu, we will enumerate
over all binary combinations of this subset to generate a can-
didate set Y for fine-tuning the prediction. Specifically, we
compute z†(y) = argminz∈Rpf(z, y, x
r) for y ∈ Y and set
the classification result as y† = argminy∈Yf(z
†(y), y, xr).
All hyper-parameters (β,b,l,yl, and yu) are determined based
on a validation set, and are therefore dataset dependent.
3.3. Implementation details
The proposed model will be tested on MNIST, NORB [20],
multiMNIST [4], and a Traffic Sign (TS) dataset. For NORB,
similar to [4], we downscale the image resolution to 48-by-
48. The multiMNIST dataset is synthesized by stacking two
MNIST images into an image of resolution 36-by-36, which
will result in 80% overlap between two digits on average.
Every image label in multiMNIST has 2 ones and 8 zeros.
A visualization of the multiMNIST dataset can be found in
Fig. 4. The TS dataset is prepared with affine transforma-
tion to mimic traffic signs at different view angles. There are
four different types of images in the dataset: “left turn”, “right
turn”, “no left turn”, and “no right turn”. These images are in
a resolution of 64-by-64, with examples visualized in Fig. 3.
There are four components for TS images to represent the
components: circle, slash, left arrow, and right arrow. For ex-
ample, a “No right turn” image has label [1, 1, 0, 1] since it
has circle, slash, and right arrow.
The number of sub-networks is equal to the number of
total components in the dataset, which is 10 for MNIST and
multiMNIST, 5 for NORB, and 4 for TS. Once the network
has been trained, it is expected to decompose the input object
into different components, as illustrated in Fig.1. To demon-
strate the efficacy of the learning of decomposition, we visu-
alize the latent space of each sub-networks trained on differ-
ent datasets in Fig.2. One observation from the results is that
the model is able to remove data redundancy automatically,
which can be seen from the TS dataset: To recall, the first
component of a TS image represents the existence of a circle.
Since the circle exists in all TS images, the learned generative
model combines the circle into the generation of the arrows
and leaves the first sub-network blank.
Fig. 2. Sampling the latent space of each generator trained on
(a) multiMNIST, (b) TS, and (c) NORB. Each sub-network is
dedicated to one component. Samples of multiMNIST train-
ing images can be found in Fig.4.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of our method
through a set of challenging experiments. These include clas-
sifying overlapping and novel objects, and defense against
both gradient-based (FGM [5]) and non-gradient based
(NEAT [19]) adversarial attacks.
4.1. Classification of novel and overlapping objects
We first train our model on the TS dataset by only using “left
turn”, “right turn” and “no right turn” images for training.
After the model is trained, its performance is evaluated on
“No left turn” images. This experiment is set up in a way that
the network is asked to recognize novel objects not included
in the training set by making use of the learned decomposition
of image elements.
A traditional feedforward CNN classifier will completely
fail under this setting, where 99% of the “no left turn” im-
ages are classified as “left turn”. This is due to the fact that
the classifier will associate the “left arrow” feature with the
“left turn” category during the training phase, and this corre-
lation strongly affects the prediction during the testing phase.
In contrast, our proposed model learns to decompose the TS
dataset into components after training (as shown in Fig. 2b),
and by combining these components together, it correctly rec-
ognizes 95% of all novel testing images. The classification
result is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Classification result on novel objects. Left: conver-
gence of component labels during the classification process,
with±3 standard deviation over all “no left turn” test images.
Right: the inputs (top), their sub-network generations (mid-
dle), and the optimal final generations (bottom).
We now demonstrate that the proposed model is able
to handle objects with large overlap using the multiMNIST
dataset. After training, the proposed model learns the decom-
position of individual digits successfully as shown in Fig.2a.
Applying the learned model to classifying the test dataset
leads to a classification accuracy of 65.6%. Successful and
failed test samples and their classification results are shown
in Fig.4. While the accuracy on multiMNIST is lower than
that of a CapsNet [4](95%), investigation of the model perfor-
mance shows that many of the misclassified samples are truly
difficult to be separated even for human beings. It should also
be noted that the accuracy of CapsNet is resulted from 60
million training data, while our model successfully decom-
poses the learns the component-wise latent spaces with only
128k data points. We expect improved classification accuracy
by increasing the capacity of the generative model.
Fig. 4. Examples of classification results on multiMNIST.
First row: input test images. Second row: predicted images. L
and P denotes ground truth and predicted labels, respectively.
4.2. Defending adversarial attacks
We test the performance of our model under both gradient-
and non-gradient-based adversarial attacks in this experiment.
FGM and NEAT are chosen as the attack methods. NEAT
performs evolution on Compositional Pattern Producing Net-
works (CPPN) [21], each of which represents an image. The
fitness of the evolution is defined as 1− ||yˆ− ytarget||, where
yˆ is the classification result of a CPPN image by the source
classification model and ytarget is the target class for the at-
tack. If an adversarial image is misclassified with over 90%
confidence, the attack is considered successful and this adver-
sarial image will be used for test.
We first compare our method with the binarization de-
fense [22] under FGM attack in Tab.1. The performance of
binarization drops quickly with increasing attack magnitudes,
while the proposed model is able to maintain high accuracy
even under relatively high attack magnitude. To further exam-
ine the cases where our model fails, we visualized adversarial
MNIST samples with  = 0.4 in Fig.5a, along with correctly
classified samples. We note that many of the misclassified
images are hard to be recognized even for human beings.
Table 1. Comparisons between baseline (binarization) and
the proposed method on robustness under FGM attacks with
increasing perturbation levels.
 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
MNIST baseline 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.76 0.51
MNIST proposed 0.95 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.82
NORB baseline 59.8 18.3 2.8 0.8 0.2
NORB proposed 87.1 61.9 40.1 24.6 18.8
The comparison on NEAT attacks is shown in Fig.5b. The
baseline classifier is fooled completely by the adversarial im-
ages with consistently high confidence for the targeted labels
(shown in the first row of Fig.5b). Even after binarization,
many NEAT images can still be misclassified with high con-
fidence (shown in the second row of Fig.5b). In contrast, the
proposed method is able to identify 90.6% of these attacks.
This is because the generative model is not trained on these
highly structured CPPN patterns, and is not able to recon-
struct them during the test. Due to the high reconstruction
error, the proposed model will conclude that these input im-
ages are out of the data distribution.
Fig. 5. Sample adversarial images. Left (first and second
row): FGM adversarial images and the generated images.L
and P denotes ground truth and predicted labels, respectively.
Right (from top to bottom row): CPPN adversarial images,
images after binarization, and generation found by proposed
method. Classification confidence of the feed-forward classi-
fier are shown under the images.
4.3. Discussion
While the presented experiments show promise of the pro-
posed classification method, a deeper investigation is needed
to better characterize the applicability and limitations of
the proposed method to more complicated datasets (e.g., CI-
FAR10 and ImageNet) under more sophisticated settings (e.g.
PGD adversarial attack [23]). Further improvements can be
made to compress the generative model in order to accelerate
the optimization during classification. Generative models
with the capability to create fine-grained details should be
studied and incorporated to further improve the performance.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the utility of a tailored condi-
tional variational autoencoder as a classifier, and test its gen-
eralizability and robustness under challenging tasks. Results
show that the proposed training and classification formula-
tions lead to promising performance: First, the model can
recognize overlapping objects and novel component combina-
tions that do not exist in the training phase. Second, our model
is able to defend against adversarial attacks well, in particu-
lar under higher attack magnitudes and under none-gradient
attacks.
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